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Great	expectations?	A	US-UK	trade	deal	will	most
likely	disappoint
The	great	fanfare	around	the	US-UK	trade	agreement	creates	expectations	that	almost	certainly	will	not	be	met,
argues	Dalibor	Rohac	(AEI).	While	the	Trump	administration	is	looking	for	an	easy	deal	and	a	symbolic	gesture,	it
stands	little	chance	of	getting	through	the	current	House	of	Representatives,	or	being	upheld	by	a	Biden	White
House.	Negotiating	an	FTA	with	the	US	needn’t	be	a	priority	for	the	British	either.	Given	how	unpopular	the	current
US	administration	is	in	the	UK,	the	political	and	PR	value	of	these	negotiations	is	low,	if	not	negative.	
The	idea	of	a	“fantastic	and	big”	US-UK	trade	agreement,	as	President	Trump	characterised	it,	sounds	certainly
appealing,	particularly	at	a	time	when	protectionism	appears	to	be	making	a	comeback.	But,	symbols	aside,	the
politics	and	the	economics	of	the	negotiations	started	by	the	UK	and	US	governments	Tuesday	last	week	feel	more
than	a	bit	off.	Moreover,	the	political	capital	invested	by	the	UK	government	would	have	been	better	spent	in	fighting
for	an	open	trade	environment	globally,	particularly	pushing	the	United	States	to	take	seriously	its	role	within	the
World	Trade	Organization.
First	of	all,	the	United	States	is	heading	into	an	election	season	with	the	disastrous	economic	fallout	from	the
COVID-19	pandemic.	Meaningful	trade	agreements	require	difficult	compromises	on	both	sides,	upsetting	interest
groups.	That	is	not	what	the	incumbent	administration	is	after.	With	the	announcement	that	the	agreement	ought	to
be	completed	in	a	year,	everything	suggests	that	President	Trump	is	looking	for	an	easy,	purely	symbolic	gesture
which	furthermore	stands	no	chance	of	getting	through	the	current	House	of	Representatives.	A	prospective	Biden
administration,	meanwhile,	would	be	ill-advised	to	tie	its	hands	with	a	UK	trade	deal	before	a	return	to	some	version
of	updated	TTIP	negotiations	with	the	European	Union.
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A	similar	logic	applies	even	more	strongly	to	the	British	side	of	the	negotiations.	Given	the	magnitude	of	UK-EU
trade	(43	per	cent	of	all	UK	exports)	and	the	importance	of	the	service	sector,	completing	a	satisfactory	deal	with
the	EU	ought	to	be	a	priority	for	the	British.	With	the	different	regulatory	cultures	reigning	on	both	sides	of	the
Atlantic,	concessions	to	Washington	necessarily	tie	the	hands	of	UK	negotiators	seeking	to	strike	an	agreement
with	Brussels.
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Furthermore,	the	current	administration	has	made	it	clear	that	it	expects	significant	concessions	in	areas	that	are
highly	sensitive	to	the	British	public,	regardless	of	Brexit.	The	opening	up	of	the	British	market	to	US	agricultural
exports	or	modifying	the	‘reimbursements	regimes’	for	pharmaceuticals	from	the	United	States	is	bound	to	be
controversial.	More	generally,	as	Daniel	Henig	of	the	European	Centre	for	International	Political	Economy	identified
in	2018,	the	absence	of	a	domestic	consensus	over	such	questions	remains	one	of	the	main	hurdles	to	an	effective
UK	trade	policy.	Adding	to	the	mix	the	salience	of	the	National	Health	Service	in	the	current	pandemic	will	make	the
entire	healthcare	industry	off-limits	for	trade	negotiations.
And	while	a	lot	of	uncertainty	surrounds	future	developments	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic,	it	is	not	obvious	how
Johnson’s	government	can	claim	victory	given	that	the	spread	of	the	disease	and	the	death	toll	appear	worse	than
in	most	European	countries.	That	is	hardly	a	good	starting	point	for	stirring	further	political	controversy,	which	a
meaningful	trade	agreement	with	the	United	States	would	entail	–	especially	considering	the	bargaining	power	of
the	two	countries.
What’s	the	point	of	it	all?	The	economic	ties	between	the	two	countries	are	already	deep.	The	UK	is,	for	example,
the	largest	foreign	investor	in	the	US	economy,	which	is	also	the	UK’s	largest	export	market	–	and	second-largest
source	of	the	UK’s	imported	goods	and	services.	Both	economies	already	feature	a	significant	degree	of	openness.
Without	much	low-hanging	fruit,	the	UK	government	estimates	the	effect	of	the	agreement	to	amount	to	0.16	per
cent	of	GDP	over	a	long-term	time	horizon.
Given	how	unpopular	the	current	US	administration	is	in	the	UK,	the	political	and	PR	value	of	these	negotiations	is
low,	if	not	negative.	If	the	aim	of	the	UK	government	is	to	dismantle	barriers	in	sectors	where	tangible	economic
gains	can	be	achieved,	a	much	better	strategy	might	involve	sectoral	work	away	from	the	spotlight	of	full-fledged
trade	negotiations.	The	US-UK	Financial	Regulatory	Working	Group,	set	up	in	2018,	provides	a	model	to	follow,	as
do	narrow	‘FinTech	bridge	agreements’	reached	in	recent	years	with	several	Asian	economies	and	Australia.
Likewise,	there	may	be	space	for	sectoral	mutual	recognition	agreements	–	the	UK	has	already	sought	to
ensure	that	the	US-EU	mutual	recognition	agreement	will	continue	to	apply	after	Brexit.	And	most	importantly,	a
post-Brexit	UK	has	a	very	strong	reason	to	seek	to	ensure	that	the	global	trading	system	remains	open.	That
cannot	be	achieved	through	bilateral	trade	agreements	but	only	through	engagement	at	the	WTO	level	and	through
various	multilateral	and	plurilateral	regulatory	fora.
A	more	piecemeal	approach	does	not	eliminate	the	basic	trade-offs	entailed	in	Brexit.	Dismantling	non-tariff	barriers
to	trade	and	investment	comes	necessarily	at	the	cost	of	giving	up	‘control’	–	that	is	equally	true	of	participating	in
the	EU’s	single	market	as	it	is	of	striking	a	deep	trade	agreement	with	the	United	States.	However,	seeking	to
navigate	those	trade-offs	by	announcing	with	great	fanfare	the	beginning	of	supposedly	landmark	trade	negotiations
creates	expectations	that	almost	certainly	will	not	be	met.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit,	nor	of	the	London	School	of
Economics.	Image:	public	domain	–	the	Agricultural	Research	Service,	the	research	agency	of	the	United	States
Department	of	Agriculture.
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